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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the 
highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed 
research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 
2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of 
knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and hope this symposium will spark even more participation. 
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active 
participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 
350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring 
scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so 
many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both 
in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, 
breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to 
establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior 
government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum 
I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.” 
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of 
the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to 
be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research 
with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to 
come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & 
Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, 
Department of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this symposium. 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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Panel 15. Major Defense Acquisition Programs: 
Assessment and Challenges to Successful 
Management Outcomes 
Thursday, May 17, 2012  
9:30 a.m. – 
11:00 p.m. 
Chair: Dr. Nancy Spruill, Director, Acquisition Resources and Analysis, Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
A GAO Assessment of the DoD’s Major Weapon Systems Acquisition Program 
Portfolio 
Michael Sullivan, Government Accountability Office 
Schedule-Driven Costs in Major Defense Programs 
Roy Wood, Defense Acquisition University 
Acquisition Risks in a World of Joint Capabilities: A Study of Interdependency 
Complexity 
Mary Maureen Brown and Graham Owen 
University of North Carolina at Charlotte 
Nancy Spruill—Dr. Spruill is the director of Acquisition Resources & Analysis at the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Dr. Spruill received her 
Bachelor of Science degree in mathematics in 1971. From 1971 to 1983 she held a variety of 
positions with the Center for Naval Analyses, including technical staff analyst, professional staff 
analyst and project director. She earned her Master of Arts in mathematical statistics in 1975, 
followed by her doctorate in 1980. 
Dr. Spruill served on the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1983 to 1993. 
Initially, she was the senior planning, programming, and budget analyst in the Manpower, Reserve 
Affairs and Logistics Secretariat. Later, she served as the director for support and liaison for the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel. Then she served as the senior 
operations research analyst in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis 
and Evaluation. 
In March 1995, she was selected as the deputy director for acquisition resources for the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]). In February 1999, she 
was appointed the director of acquisition resources and analysis (ARA) for the USD(AT&L). In this 
capacity, she is responsible for all aspects of AT&L’S participation in the Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting System (PPBS); the congressional process; and the Defense Acquisition System. She 
serves as the executive secretary to the Defense Acquisition Board and is responsible for the timely 
and accurate submission to Congress of Selected Acquisition Reports and Unit Cost Reports for 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs. She manages the Defense Acquisition Execution Summary 
monthly review of programs; monitors cost and schedule status of high interest programs; and 
conducts analyses of contract and program cost performance including analysis of the effective use 
of integrated program management principles through the use of earned value management. She 
leads the Department in developing plans to manage property, plant and equipment, inventory, 
operating materials and supplies/deferred maintenance and environmental liabilities. She proposes 
modifications to, or acquisition of, new DoD feeder systems, in support of achieving an unqualified 
audit opinion on DoD financial statements as mandated by the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act. 
She also manages the studies program for the OSD, oversees the USD(AT&L)'s office automation 
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system and manages its information system network. She serves as the focal point for DoD-wide 
software-intensive systems program initiatives to improve mechanisms for the management of 
defense acquisition programs; manages software intensive systems assessment initiatives; performs 
systemic analysis from independent expert program reviews to improve acquisition policy and 
education, and conducts special analyses for the under secretary. 
Dr. Spruill has been a member of the Senior Executive Service since 1995. She is a certified 
acquisition professional and an active member of the American Statistical Association. Her many 
honors and awards include the Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service, the Defense Medal 
for Meritorious Civilian Service, the Hammer Award, and the Presidential Rank Award. She has 
contributed papers in publications of the statistics and defense analyses communities and authored 
articles in the general press on how politicians use—and abuse—statistics. 
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Schedule-Driven Costs in Major Defense Programs 
Roy Wood—Dr. Wood is the dean of the Defense Systems Management College, Defense 
Acquisition University. A retired Navy engineering duty officer, Dr. Wood has experience in shipboard 
combat systems remote sensing, high energy lasers, and missile defense. He holds a BS in computer 
science from Texas A&M University, master’s degrees in engineering and business, and a PhD in 
organization and management. His dissertation dealt with program manager competencies. 
[roy.wood@dau.mil] 
Abstract 
Most program managers seem focused on controlling costs and delivering a quality product. 
The third leg of the acquisition stool—program schedule—is perceived to be less important 
and seems to be a resource that can be slipped to accommodate unstable funding or 
technical difficulties when they are encountered. Given that most major defense program 
schedules span years or even decades, schedule slips are less likely given their importance. 
This paper reviews the extant literature on cost and schedule relationships and examines the 
reasons that schedules may be problematic to acquisition success. Synthesis of previous 
findings, together with results of an exploratory survey of program management course 
students at the Defense Acquisition University, provide the basis for several propositions for 
further study that may improve acquisition outcomes. 
Introduction 
This paper explores the relationship between program cost and schedule. The 
literature is inconsistent and seemingly contradictory in many of the conclusions about the 
impact that schedule can have on cost and program performance. While most of us have 
heard the supposed truism that “time is money,” there has been little evidence that schedule 
has been a focus of program managers’ attempts to control costs. As an exploratory effort, 
this research examined the literature on program scheduling and the relationship of program 
schedules to cost and program performance. Using an informal survey of 71 program 
managers attending 400-level courses at the Defense Systems Management College, the 
paper also examines program manager attitudes toward their own program schedules. The 
paper synthesizes this material and provides several propositions for further research. 
Time Is Money 
Program success is traditionally measured by cost, schedule, and performance. 
When issues arise, trade-offs between these three are made, and conventional wisdom 
says you can generally preserve only two of the three. For example, if current budgets are 
cut, then programs are forced either to give up some bells and whistles in performance or to 
lower the spend rate and stretch out the program schedule. If the program schedule is 
delayed for reasons such as lagging technology readiness or testing failures, then program 
costs will rise or content will have to be sacrificed.  
When making such trade-offs, there are reasonably good tools and techniques for 
estimating the cost impacts, and performance trades are similarly understandable. However, 
when it comes to program schedules, trade-offs can be much less clear and the impacts 
more difficult to determine. Working harder or placing more management emphasis on 
problem areas are often believed to be practical ways to improve performance and 
compress schedules to remain on track. Too often, however, these ideas can lead to the 
attitudes that time, unlike money, is somehow more elastic and forgiving. This also leads to 
misapprehensions about the diminished value of program time in the future versus the 
amplified importance that urgency brings regarding current schedule issues. At times, 
managers feel that resource problems occurring in the near term can be “fixed” by pushing 
problems into the future. This can result in moving milestones forward while keeping the 
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program end date static and compressing the activities in between. This forces activities to 
become more concurrent, increasing the need to more closely synchronize tasks and the 
increasing the complexity of synchronizing program activities. 
Creating Program Schedules 
In an ideal situation, program schedules are developed in a rational and linear 
manner. Program requirements are analyzed and developed through the iterative system 
engineering process, allocating required functions to be performed by the system’s 
hardware, software, and operators. Work breakdown structures (WBS) are created, 
assigning those functions to subsystems and components. At the lowest level of the WBS, 
work packages are developed that estimate the resources—dollars, time, and 
manpower/expertise—required to build, test, and deliver the hardware and software widgets. 
Rolling up the task-level resource requirements to higher levels of the WBS, then, allows the 
program manager to create a total program budget estimate, resource-loaded schedule, and 
program manpower estimate. This integrated master schedule will show each task with its 
estimated duration, required human and physical resources, linkage to other tasks to show 
dependencies (e.g., Task B cannot start until Task A is complete), major milestones where 
tasks culminate in a defining program event, and the calculated program end date and 
critical path. If each task is then given the appropriate resources and is managed in order to 
be completed within its estimated time frame, then the program execution proceeds from 
start to finish with nary a problem. 
Unfortunately, this is generally not how program schedules are arrived at. Project 
end dates are more often arrived at starting with a “need date” established early in the 
program by the user or sponsor, without regard to program details or complexity. In the 
survey of program management students at the Defense Systems Management College 
(DSMC) in 2011, only 18% reported that their program end date was determined through a 
roll-up of task level schedules, while 58% reported end dates that were predetermined by 
need. 
Herein appears to lay the source of some inherent program problems. In this method 
of program end date determination, the end date is fixed and the program milestones are 
“backed out” from there. Other project tasks are fitted into the milestone scheme, along with 
whatever concurrency and optimism are needed to make the schedule work. Fully 82% of 
the program management students participating in the DSMC survey reported that their 
program schedules contained some or significant concurrency with moderate to high 
schedule risk. 
In execution, these programs must accept risks to stay on schedule. The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has noted repeatedly in its annual Assessments of 
Selected Weapons Programs that projects proceed through milestones without reaching the 
requisite knowledge points (GAO, 2009, 2010, 2011). This results in many programs being 
“at a higher risk for cost growth and schedule delays” (GAO, 2011, p. 2). 
Project Concurrency 
The reasons most often cited for foreshortened schedules and concurrency are 
outlined in the following sections. 
To Meet an Urgent Need for a Product 
Mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles were a contemporary case in 
which there was an urgent battlefield need for vehicles that could protect soldiers from 
improvised explosive devices (IED). The original program schedule for a limited number of 
the vehicles was vastly expanded to maximize the number of vehicles in theater in a short 
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period of time. There was concurrency within and across vehicle types and contractors. It 
was a Herculean effort reminiscent of the ramp-up in World War II in the rapid mobilization 
of the industrial base to provide the number of needed vehicles for the war. 
On the other hand, programs are too often assigned unrealistic need dates and have 
little to no chance to deliver the programs on time. For example, the F-22 Raptor program 
was begun in 1981 as the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program, with an initial operating 
capability need date of 1993. The actual capability was delivered 12 years late, in December 
2005. Likewise, the Navy’s Surface Combatant, 21st Century, or SC-21, was envisioned to 
be delivered in fiscal year 2008. Ultimately, the ship class was renamed the DDG-1000, the 
first of which has not yet been delivered to the fleet. Both programs experienced severe 
technical challenges and cost overruns that contributed to severely restricting the numbers 
of aircraft and ships originally required. 
To Avoid Obsolescence 
Evolutionary acquisition is a paradigm in which a design is frozen at a point in time 
and the system goes to production as-is. Later, new technologies and capabilities may be 
added incrementally to the design and later systems may be produced with those upgrades. 
While this process limits the “churn” and allows stable baselines to be designed and 
produced, it requires some concurrency in design and integration as each new block is 
started. These new designs commence before the previous baseline system has been fully 
built, tested, and employed in the field. This creates the possibility of design rework. 
To Maintain the Industrial Base 
Defense companies must maintain a relatively steady flow of work to keep their 
engineers, designers, and manufacturing personnel employed and maintain their 
competitive expertise. This means that, for example, as one submarine transitions from 
design to production, another new submarine requirement should ideally be coming in the 
door to keep the designers employed. Otherwise, these talented individuals might leave the 
companies, making reconstituting submarine design in the future very challenging. While 
this process is perhaps inefficient from the government’s perspective, it is necessary to 
prevent losing vital national defense skills. 
Drivers of Schedule Slippage 
Performance challenges can create schedule slippage in a variety of ways.  
Technology “Reach” 
It is not uncommon for large, complex defense programs to rely on relatively 
immature technologies that require significant in-line development. The need to meet a 
supposed future threat drives an appetite among users toward ever greater technical 
capabilities, many of which are immature (or even nonexistent). For example, stressing 
requirements for the Air Force F-22 Raptor included stealthy titanium and composite 
structures, advanced avionics, active-array radar, supersonic cruise, and dozens more 
enabling technologies (Copp, 2007). Similarly, the Navy’s Zumwalt-class destroyer included 
requirements for reduced crew size, integrated dual-band active-array radar, integrated 
power system, electric drive, stealthy tumblehome hullform, integrated superstructure, 155 
mm advanced gun, and peripheral vertical launching system (Galdorisi & Truver, 2010, p. 
66). Many of these advanced technologies in both programs were co-developed and 
matured during the engineering and manufacturing development phases (Francis, 2005; 
GAO, 1998). 
Schedule and cost uncertainty are high for any new technology development, but this 
uncertainty becomes a substantial risk when overlaid on program milestones that depend 
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upon success and delivery of the technology to support testing and fielding a new system. 
When there are several new technology developments ongoing, as in the case of the F-22 
and the Zumwalt destroyer, this uncertainty multiplies and orchestration of technology 
insertion becomes extremely challenging. It should be little surprise, then, that both of these 
programs delivered substantially late and over budget (O’Rourke, 2012; Bolkcom, 2009). 
Insertion Time and Rework 
Requirements changes during a program’s lifetime can also have a substantial 
impact on schedule and cost. In a recent Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) analysis, $37 billion of cost overruns in the major defense acquisition program 
portfolio are attributed to schedule, and the CSIS report notes that defense contractors cite 
requirements changes late in a program as a major cause of schedule impacts (Berteau, 
Hofbauer, Sanders, & Ben-Ari, 2010).   
A recent industry white paper stated that “frequent and ‘inside lead time’ changes to 
program requirements and production schedules are major obstacles to successful cost and 
schedule attainment for most aerospace and defense programs” (Archstone Consulting, 
2012). This assertion is backed by the 2008 GAO analysis of defense weapons systems that 
stated that “sixty-three percent of the programs we received data from had requirements 
changes after system development began. These programs encountered cost increases of 
72 percent, while costs grew by 11 percent among those programs that did not change 
requirements” (p. 5).  
When requirements changes occur during development, replanning and rework 
follow. New requirements must be flow down as allocated functions via the system 
engineering process. Now, however, the new requirements must be integrated as well as 
possible into existing program plans. This adds complexity and takes time and care to avoid 
unintended downstream conflicts and consequences. Requirements changes drive drawing 
and specification revisions, modification of schedules and task budgets, and reallocation of 
resources to attend to new or modified tasks. In almost any conceivable circumstance, prior 
wasted effort will be scrapped and rework will be required to accommodate new changes, 
exacerbating the delay and disruption created by the new requirements. 
Unstable Budgets 
Unstable funding has often been blamed for program schedule and cost issues. 
Langbein (2004) cites three different types of funding instability that impact programs. The 
first is perhaps the most obvious—quantity of dollars. These are programs with insufficient 
total funding to perform the required tasks to deliver the system. This problem can be 
caused by poor cost estimating for the funding that is needed by the program, unforeseen 
and unbudgeted changes, or overly optimistic cost targets. In defense acquisition, there are 
two other less obvious funding pitfalls in colors of money and timing of money that can 
create program instability and schedule problems. 
Colors of Money 
In every program, defense program managers must break down total funding into its 
constituent functions and categories, known as different colors of money, for specific 
portions of the program. Research and development, procurement, operations and 
maintenance, shipbuilding and conversion, and other colors of money must be appropriately 
aligned to fund the associated tasks in the program. At times, a program may have sufficient 
overall funding but an incorrect allocation within the colors of money. The program manager 
may find that there are shortfalls in some areas and surpluses in others but not have the 
authority to move the congressionally appropriated dollars from one account to another. 
These shortfalls can stop activities in parts of the program and create overall delays.  
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=moldo^jW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= -=20 - 
=
Timing of Funding 
Timing of funding can also create similar problems. Program budgets are closely 
aligned with planned work in any given year. If challenges or opportunities arise within the 
year of execution, current year funding may not be sufficient to accommodate new funding 
requirements, again creating potential delay and disruption to the program schedule.  
In each of these cases, program schedules must be replanned to accommodate 
different funding realities. Reprogramming or repurposing current-year funding is generally 
not simple or quick. Requests for more, or different, funding can take up to two years to 
realize through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system. The 
alternative to reprogramming may be that tasks must be trimmed in the current year and 
work adjusted so the financial impacts can be addressed over the longer term. When these 
things happen, key events and milestones are missed, concurrency increases, and 
opportunities are lost. 
“Marching Army” 
Whether from requirements changes, funding instability, or other causes, any 
schedule delays create disruption to well-planned and ongoing activities. In many cases, 
while waiting for problems to be resolved, the government and contractor workforce remains 
in place but their contributions to the program are less than optimal. Nevertheless, this less 
productive workforce continues charging to the program, driving up costs. Simply disbanding 
the program team for temporary delays is generally not practical. Moving highly specialized 
individuals with experience and intimate knowledge of their assigned program to other 
programs or tasks, with an eye to reassemble them later after the causes of the delays are 
determined and fixed, does not usually make sense. Reconstituting the team would create 
more churn—and cost—both in the delayed program as well as in the new projects to which 
they were temporarily assigned. This “marching army” cost, then, may be considered a fixed 
cost that must be paid regardless of the productivity impacts caused by delays. When 
programs are disrupted, these costs continue largely unabated, adding to total program cost 
whether or not the labor is contributing substantially to program completion. The longer the 
delay continues, the more these unproductive costs build. Time is money. 
Schedule Optimism 
Given that many program end dates are set well before any of the work begins, 
perceived necessity, concurrency, and optimism drive milestone schedules and tasks. Once 
the analysis of the work that must be accomplished is underway, there is tremendous 
pressure to keep to original agreements and promises to deliver, however unrealistic these 
turn out to be. In the “Conspiracy of Optimism” white paper, the International Centre for 
Complex Project Management (ICCPM) authors explain, 
once initial project budgets and schedules are set, based on such estimates, 
they have immense staying power, driven by collective unrealistic 
expectations, even to the extent that over time, system functionality and 
project resources are sacrificed in order to achieve what was unobtainable in 
the first place. (p. 14) 
Longer Programs Cost More…For Many Not-So-Obvious Reasons 
The Packard Commission noted in 1986 that “an unreasonably long acquisition cycle 
… is a central problem from which most other acquisition problems stem” (p. 8). Echoing this 
sentiment 20 years later, a Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) report 
recommended that, instead of waiting decades for 100% performance, programs be held to 
a time certain development period of six years from Milestone A to delivery of a militarily 
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useful capability (Kadish, 2006, p. 12). The report enumerated some of the benefits of 
shorter development cycles. Operators with a basic capability in hand would gain a better 
understanding of full requirements to be inserted in future baselines. Technology in the initial 
design would be at a higher readiness level, and technologies would mature during the 
period between first deliveries and subsequent upgrades, making it easier to develop to full 
capability over time. New requirements and technologies would be intentionally inserted in 
later baselines, removing the temptation to perturb the current development and adding 
stability to the acquisition. Reducing time in development would also help add funding 
stability across the entire program portfolio (Kadish, 2006, pp. 12–13). 
Coleman, Summerville, and Dameron (2003) examined the relationship between 
cost and schedule using RAND’s Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) cost growth database. 
Analyzing 59 programs in EMD phase, these researchers found no statistical correlation 
between cost and schedule length. However, in a dissertation study of 154 defense projects 
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), McNutt (1998) found that cost increased 
on a 4th power scale with development time. Figure 1 is McNutt’s “best fit” curve on a 
logarithmic scale. Figure 2 shows the power relationship on a linear plot for emphasis and 
clarity. One can observe that the “knee in the curve,” where costs begin to escalate 
significantly, is around 6.5 years, indicating that costs for programs with schedules that 
extend beyond this point risk quickly becoming unaffordable. 
 
Figure 1. Development Cost vs. Development Time 
(McNutt, 1998) 
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Figure 2. Development Cost vs. Time on Linear Scale 
Note. Cost is shown in millions of dollars, and time is shown in years. 
There are reasons that may explain why the length of a program impacts its cost so 
dramatically. First, longer schedules from inception may be an acknowledgement of their 
developmental complexity. Programs with substantial capability needs, advanced 
technology, unique features, or with significant integration or interdependencies with other 
programs can be expected from the outset to take longer to develop and/or have greater 
schedule risk and cost.  
Programs with long time lines may also be subject to more requirements changes as 
threats and technologies evolve over time. As new threats emerge during a program’s 
development, there would be pressure to try to address those threats by adding or refining 
the delivered system’s capabilities. Likewise, emergent technologies could offer greater 
capability if developed and incorporated into the system’s design. The added benefit of 
newer, more modern and capable technologies would also be a tempting reason to modify 
the program’s plan. Just as important, over a long development period original program 
technologies may become obsolete before the system can be delivered, requiring that new 
technology be incorporated. All these changes, as noted earlier, must be replanned, often 
requiring scrap and rework and increased time and cost to deliver. 
Long programs also potentially suffer from greater budgetary churn. Each new fiscal 
year presents an opportunity for decision-makers outside the program to make funding 
adjustments that perturb the program’s overall performance. Longer programs must survive 
more fiscal-year budget challenges and more annual opportunities for budgetary uncertainty 
and strife. Likewise, longer programs with large budgets can be tempting targets for 
harvesting funds to help other programs get well. This can happen at any level in the 
organization, from the program executive officer through the defense comptrollers and/or 
Congress.  
Proposition 1a. Longer-duration programs are subject to greater increases in 
cost and schedule.  
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Program Managers Trust and Use Their Integrated Master Schedules—Sort 
of… 
The process of scheduling itself is difficult and may not always be as useful as it 
could be as a key project management tool. The National Defense Industrial Association’s 
Industrial Committee for Project Management (NDIA IACP) recognized that the art of 
scheduling for complex projects was problematic for government programs and recently 
chartered the Program Planning and Scheduling Subcommittee to create the Planning and 
Scheduling Excellence Guide (PASEG; NDIA, 2011).  This guide was designed to assist 
government and industry to create more useful, consistent, and standardized integrated 
master schedules (IMS) using the principles of the Generally Accepted Scheduling Practices 
(GASP). The guide emphasizes practical skills and application of sound scheduling 
principles to create a schedule that models the acquisition plan, provides tips for schedule 
maintenance and advice for project managers to use the IMS more appropriately to manage 
a complex government program.  
The survey of program managers at the Defense Systems Management College 
revealed some insights into how schedules are viewed by current managers. Of those 
polled, 96% believe that having an integrated and up-to-date schedule is critical to running 
their programs, and two-thirds say they have confidence in the accuracy of their master 
schedules. However, less than half believe that their schedule is accurately resource loaded 
and 51% believe that their schedule includes all work required by government and 
contractors. These results seem to be inconsistent and perhaps contradictory: only half 
believe their schedules to be complete and accurate, yet most have confidence in the 
schedule and overwhelmingly believe that it is important to their program’s success! Table 1 
summarizes these views. 








Having an integrated and up-to-date schedule is 
critical to running my program. 
96% 4% 
I have confidence in the accuracy of my master 
schedule. 
65% 35% 
My schedule is accurately resource-loaded. 45% 55% 
My program schedule is realistic and achievable 56% 44% 
My schedule includes all required work, including 
that of government organizations, all contractors, 
and subcontractors. 
51% 49% 
Similarly, in execution, 56% believe that their schedules are realistic and achievable, 
while 40% report that their programs are behind schedule. When faced with hypothetical 
budget cuts, 48% of the managers indicated that they would defer requirements or 
capabilities, while only 20% would slip schedule as a preferred method to manage overruns. 
However, the program managers assigned the highest priority for their programs as 
ensuring quality and performance of their products, and they ranked controlling program 
scope last in relative priority. Again, while their responses to questions of importance align 
closely with current policies of adjusting scope to budget, the practical priorities that PMs 
place on performance and scope would seem contradictory.  
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Finally, when posed with the statement, “Maintaining an accurate detailed schedule 
is too labor-intensive and costly for the value,” fewer than 10% agreed or strongly agreed. 
However, when asked about current program issues, respondents reported difficulty in 
synchronizing schedules among players as an issue second only to unstable funding. Again, 
this seems to indicate the importance that PMs place on the theoretical value of their 
integrated master schedules and an implicit recognition that large program scheduling is 
challenging.  
Proposition 2a. Program managers who understand and use their project 
schedules as a management tool are more likely to be successful. 
Proposition 2b. Project managers’ stated opinions and beliefs about the 
importance and control of program schedules are at odds with actual 
behavior in managing those schedules. 
Conspiracy of Optimism: Overestimating Abilities While Underestimating 
Effort 
An earlier section of this paper discussed the problems created when program teams 
and stakeholders underestimate the challenges and overestimate their abilities to deliver on 
success-oriented, aggressive schedules. This optimistic thinking necessarily flows down 
from the government to the system contractors. Once the government team has fallen into 
its own overly-optimistic decision trap, contract requests for proposal are written based on 
the ill-conceived plan and contractors come to the table hoping to have the most attractive 
bid to meet the government’s expectations. Unfortunately, this also often creates an 
environment where realistic assessments of cost and schedule are undervalued and 
contractors who refuse to join in on the conspiracy risk losing the job. 
It is common for commercial considerations to lead to “doctoring” of the 
estimate in order to drive estimated costs down—particularly where there are 
strategic reasons for wanting to win that particular bid. Later, at the planning 
stage, this “doctoring” is forgotten and unrealistic plans are made. As the 
project unfolds, this lack of realism is very likely to play one of the most 
significant and unattributed roles in increased costs. Underestimating at the 
planning stage is one of the most common triggers for cost escalation. (Eden, 
Ackermann, & Williams, 2005, p. 19) 
Kahneman (2011) argued that the optimism bias is inherent and pervasive in 
individuals and teams taking risks under conditions of uncertainty or ambiguity. He offered 
that remedies to this bias are often gained by comparing time lines for similar prior projects 
as a baseline for the current one, or getting an outside view from a third party who may be 
able to assess the reasonableness of project estimates. He also encouraged the practice of 
pre-mortems, where the project team envisions future project failure and offers all the things 
that might have caused it (Kahneman, 2011, p. 264). This exercise may empower the team 
to bring to light issues that have not been previously considered (or ignored), help break 
overly optimistic groupthink, and encourage the team to accept evidence of over-optimism in 
the project’s planning. 
Proposition 3. Program plans that are subjected to objective oversight that 
considers historical data and trends to assess the realism of the program 
schedule and cost can reduce over-optimism and improve contract outcomes. 
Difficulty of Obtaining Data Blurs Visibility Into Challenges and Opportunities 
McNutt (1998) reported that analysis of schedule duration and schedule slips was 
difficult because of the lack of data. This author found that the situation has not improved 
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significantly in the intervening 14 years. The best public information on defense program 
cost and schedules remains the SARs, which are accessible to defense employees through 
the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) database. However, 
schedule data cannot be easily retrieved or manipulated, making analysis difficult. 
In 1996, RAND provided an important data set on several hundred defense 
programs, relying largely on the SAR data (Jarvaise, Drezner, & Norton, 1996). This 
database appears frequently as a source for analytical work in the earlier literature but has 
not been maintained or updated with more recent data. There appears to be no current or 
ongoing efforts to create or maintain program information that facilitates straightforward 
research on base trends or analyses. Future research would benefit greatly from the 
identification, compilation, and maintenance of robust and public data in a consistent, clean 
program cost and schedule database. 
Proposition 4a. Researchers would benefit from better quality and more 
accessible program data on cost, schedule, and performance to allow them to 
examine relationships and trends in program performance. 
Proposition 4b. Program managers and defense decision-makers would 
make better-informed choices and trade-offs given better-quality research on 
program trends and relationships. 
Future Research 
In the future, each of the propositions enumerated in this paper should be examined 
more closely, particularly in light of conflicting research and counterintuitive results in many 
studies in the literature. To facilitate this, the Department of Defense should make a 
concerted effort to compile a useful and useable database of cost and schedule data, similar 
to the 1996 RAND data set. Researchers could then perform more consistent, in-depth 
analysis of program data, looking for causal relationships and trends that may point toward 
systemic problems and root causes of cost and schedule growth. Additional policy research 
seems to be called for to examine oversight of programs to ensure that subtle behavioral 
forces and biases, like over-optimism, are eliminated or minimized when creating program 
cost and schedule estimates. Finally, there is a need for research into how project managers 
and other decision-makers use schedule data with an aim to ultimately create better tools 
and techniques to make reviewing and manipulating schedules simpler and more easily 
understandable. 
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Appendix: Demographics of Survey Participants 
An informal survey was taken of two classes of senior program managers (PMs) at 
the Defense Systems Management College to get their views on program cost, schedule, 
and performance relationships. The survey was particularly focused on PM views of their 
schedules and scheduling processes. Table 2 shows the demographics of the survey 
participants. 
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Table 2. Demographics of Survey Participants 
  Total 
1. What is your current position  
PEO/DPEO 5 
Government PM/DPM 54 
APM/Program Functional Leader 3 
Government Other 5 
Contractor, PM/DPM 1 
Contractor, Other 3 
  71 
2. The Program I am managing is a  
Weapons System Program 48 
IT/AIS/BS 9 
Procurement of Services 5 
Other 10 
  72 
3. The program I am managing is in the:   
Research & Development 5 
Technology & Development 8 
Engineering & Manufacturing Development Phase 15 
Production & Deployment Phase 32 
Operations & Support Phase 15 
Other 8 
Don't Know 0 
All Phases of ACQ 5 
  88 
4. The program I am managing is an:   
ACAT1 36 
ACAT2 15 
ACAT 3 or 4 20 
Portfolio 5 
non-ACAT 7 
  83 
Note. Totals exceed number of respondents who were responsible for multiple programs. 
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